
Climate of Trust





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Overview

MILITAR VI IN ATTACAS

- Research
- Climate Protection Architecture (Chapter 1)
- Options for Protecting the Climate (Chapters 2-9)
- Conclusion (chapter 10)



Research



- Purpose
 - Help prepare civil society and governments for the coming debate over future commitment periods
- Objective: Explore different approaches to promoting North-South cooperation on climate change
 - Explain, examine existing proposals *and* investigate new ideas
 - Carry out a critical analysis of different options



Designing a Climate Protection Architecture: *What are the Possible Elements and Options?*

- Legal Nature of Commitments
 - Binding
 - Non-Binding
 - Mixture

• Type of GHG Limitation Commitment

- Tax
- PAMs (e.g., harmonized PAMs; SD-PAMs)
- Targets (e.g., fixed, dynamic, dual)

• Approach to Differentiating Commitments

- Pledge-based (e.g., Kyoto-style)
- Principle-based (e.g., Brazilian Proposal, equal per capita)
- Timing and Triggers
 - By existing or new Annex

Coverage and Scope of Actions

- Different gases and/or sectors



OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE

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Designing a Climate Protection Architecture: What are the Possible Elements and Options?

Continued...

- Market-Based Mechanisms

- Int'l emissions trading
- CDM
- Sector-CDM

Financial and Technology Commitments

- Funding for adaptation/impacts compensation
- Funding for clean energy development

Accountability Mechanisms

- Measurement, reporting, and review of commitments
- Compliance system

Overall Environmental Objective

- UNFCCC Article 2
- More specific (e.g., keep 450 CO₂ eq. option open)



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2. Continuing Kyoto: Emission Caps in DCs?



- . Description of the current climate protection architecture .Two possible paths to further develop the climate change regime:
 - Accession of individual non-Annex I Parties to Annex I and setting emissions caps
 - Launch of a new negotiating round
- . Challenges of extending caps to developing countries
 - Most likely within negotiating groups (exempt LDCs, rest of G77 or subgroups, other groupings)
- Need for adapting the system to DCs needs (base year, cap scope, accounting-reporting- review, compliance, flexib. mechs.) **. Conclusion:**
 - Procedurally, the design of the climate change regime is highly adaptable
 - Political obstacles ; current lack of authoritative emissions data

- **3. Sustainable Development Policies and Measures**
- . Backcast from desired future state of development (commitment to implementing SD policies in practice)
 . Climate change: "ancillary benefit" of achieving SD (assumption that, on balance, GHG emissions will be reduced / conventional development path)
- . Steps applying SD-PAMs (example of South Africa):
 - country outlines future development objectives
 - identifies PAMs to achieve D more sustainably
 - Quantifies the changes in GHG emissions
 - Identifies synergies or conflicts (SD benefits/GHG limitations)
 - Summarizes net impact of SD-PAMs on D and GHG emissions
- **. Strength:** acknowledges each country' situation, starts from D **. Weakness:** does not guarantee a global reduction in GHG



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4. Evolving to a Sector-Based CDM



. Complementary to the current CDM

Projects could be : sectoral (electricity, transport, forestry),
 territorial (cities, regions), a combination of both
 Built on the current CDM in terms of :

- **funding** (emission reductions sold to industrialized country)
- country's definition of sustainable development priorities
- project cycle (approval, registration, certification)
- additionality
- **no target:** emission reductions relative to the BAU case
- . Case-Study of Mexico City (Federal District, across sectors)
- A win-win option (deeper cuts in ICs, higher contribution of DCs)
 Challenge: technical capacity



- 5. Dual-Intensity Targets: Reducing Uncertainty
- . Future GHG emissions highly uncertain in DCs . Under fixed targets, for DCs:
 - objective may be difficult (costly) to reach
 - Or may lead to "hot air"
- . Dynamic target: emission target adjusts to another variable (GDP)
 - emissions intensity target : I = Emissions/GDP^a
 - indexed target: allowable em. relative to AAAGR of GDP
- . Dual targets : 2 targets for a country
 - lower target (selling) : incentive to reduce emissions
 - higher target (purchasing): punitive function
 - in-between : safe zone
- . Compatibility with international emissions trading
- Low-risk strategy to participate in global climate protection
 Complexity of negotiations internationally





- 6. Learning from the Argentine Voluntary Commitment
- **Announced at COP 4, 1998** (held in Buenos Aires) **Political context:**
 - International pressure on DCs ; Argentine's foreign policy
 - Expected access to ALL the flexibility mechanisms of the KP
- . Establishing the target:
 - Procedurally : closed government circle + private sector advisory committee + technical team
 - Emissions intensity target, function of the square root of GDP
- . Inherent challenges of the voluntary commitment :
 - Argentine GHG emissions not solely linked to GDP
 - No strategy to operationalize the target within int'al context

. Lessons for other countries:

- Need for enhanced technical expertise when setting a target
- Need for involvement of domestic stakeholders and buy-in
- WRI

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- Need for a workable, policy-consistent target

Options for Protecting the Climate 7. The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility

. The original BP (1997) :

- Emission reductions for Annex I, 30 % below 1990 levels by 2020
- Reductions distributed according to the country's relative responsibility for global warming
- Creation of a punitive fund (CDF) for non complying countries ; funds distributed according to relative responsibility of DCs
- **. Defining responsibility :** the farther down the causal chain of global warming (from emissions to sea level rise), the larger responsibility share for ICs

. Future potential of the BP : how to adapt it ?

- Use cumulative emissions instead of global warming for resp. ; from 1990 onwards ?
- Participation threshold (eg GDP/cap)
- Participation of DCs when their relative resp. exceeds ICs' res



8. Equal Per Capita Entitlements

- . A resource-sharing issue:
 - Limited assimilative capacity of the atmosphere / GHGs
 - Every human being is equally entitled to this resource
 - Definition of an allowable level of global emissions ("budget")
 - Distribution of this budget equally among the global population
- . Examples: GCI's Contraction and Convergence ; variants
- . Debates :
 - Is the atmosphere an allocatable natural resource ?
 - Is the Equal Per Capita Entitlements approach equitable ?
 - Benefits from international emissions trading: essential to approach
 - Is the approach flexible to account for national circumstances?
 - Potential for global acceptability ?

. Author's proposal : fixed portion of entitlement(level of per cap survised emissions) combined with variable portion (national circumstances)





Options for Protecting the Climate 9. Differentiated Commitment Scenarios: Quantitative Analysis

.Intermediate environmental goal compatible with LT 450-550 ppmv CO2 concentration goal .Formalization of 3 worldwide CO2 emission allocation

proposals over the period 2010-2030:

- Per Capita Convergence
- Relative Responsibility
- Emission- Intensity Target

. Results in terms of distribution of emission allowances :

- Emission limitations + stringent for Annex I,
- 2030 allowances: above 1990 levels for Non-Annex I (NAI)
- In Per Cap Conv, allowance surpluses of some NAI

. Results in terms of costs and trade

- Across scenarios, higher reduction costs in AI
- Trading: benefits for all ; typically AI are buyers, NAI sellers
- Per Cap Conv: highest volume of trade (transfer of wealth)




Options for Protecting the Climate Conclusion



- . No proposal can satisfy the interests and concerns of all countries . Options depicted could be part of a climate protection architecture
- . Design of a menu of near-term options to build confidence
 - Multiple options : enhanced participation in emissions reductions
 - Some options may operate simultaneously in different countries
 - Experience, capacity gained (eg through SD-PAMs, S-CDM)
 - But insufficient to address climate change over the LT

. Need for a Principled, Long-Term Framework

- To combat bargaining power of pledged-based commitments
- To avoid the complexity of multiple options
- Could include a more definite environmental objective







OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE

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