A comprehensive introduction to game theory, incorporating exercises, examples and advanced topics.

Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers.

1. The game of chess 2. Utility theory 3. Extensive-form games 4. Strategic-form games 5. Mixed strategies 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn’s theorem 7. Equilibrium refinements 8. Correlated equilibria 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model 11. The universal belief space 12. Auctions 13. Repeated games 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs 15. Bargaining games 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility 17. The core 18. The Shapley value 19. The bargaining set 20. The nucleolus 21. Social choice 22. Stable matching 23. Appendices