Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. v.3
- 발행사항
- Amsterdam : North-Halland, 2008
- 형태사항
- (면수복잡)xxx,1522-2351,I-26p. ; 25cm
- 총서사항
- Handbooks in Economics ; 11
소장정보
| 위치 | 등록번호 | 청구기호 / 출력 | 상태 | 반납예정일 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
이용 가능 (1) | ||||
| 자료실 | E203794 | 대출가능 | - | |
- 등록번호
- E203794
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
- 자료실
책 소개
The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.
Reviews
"This is the third and last volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. ...The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prinze winners." --Zentralblatt fur Mathematik, vol. 993, 2002"Volume 3 of a three-volume set surveying the state of the art in game theory." --Journal of Economic Literature
"No one can keep up with the whole literature, so we have come to recognize these volumes as immensely valuable. They are on almost everyone's shelf. ...I would love to see volumes 4, 5, and 6, with more of what Aumann and Hart and their authors have given us. The Handbook has become the first reference for anyone who wants to learn of game-theoretical results outside their own area. It has been a long task for the editors but has greatly benefited the rest of us, and we are all grateful." --Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, no. 1
목차
Preface (R.J. Aumann, S. Hart). Strategic equilibrium (E. van Damme). Foundations of strategic equilibrium (J. Hillas, E. Kohlberg). Incomplete information (R.J. Aumann, A. Heifetz). Non-zero-sum two-person games (T.E.S. Raghavan). Computing equilibria for two-person games (B. von Stengel). Non-cooperative games with many players (M. Ali Khan, Y. Sun). Stochastic games (J-F. Mertens). Stochastic games: recent results (N. Vieille). Game theory and industrial organization (K. Bagwell, A. Wolinsky). Bargaining with incomplete information (L.M. Ausubel, P. Cramton, R.J. Deneckere). Inspection Games (R. Avenhaus, B.V. Stengel, S.Zamir). Economic history and game theory (A. Greif). The shapley value (E. Winter). Variations on the shapley value (D. Monderer, D. Samet). Values of non-transferable utility games (R. McLean). Values of games with infinitely many players (A. Neyman). Values of perfectly competitive economies (S. Hart). Some other economic applications of the value (J-F. Mertens). Strategic aspects of political systems (J. Banks). Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions (J-P. Benoit, L.A. Kornhauser). Implementation Theory (T. Palfrey). Game Theory and experimental Gaming (M. Shubik).