
단행본
Game Theory
- 발행사항
- Cambridge, Mass. ; London : MIT Press, 1991
- 형태사항
- xxiii,579p. : ill.; 26cm
- 서지주기
- Includes bibliographical references and index
소장정보
위치 | 등록번호 | 청구기호 / 출력 | 상태 | 반납예정일 |
---|---|---|---|---|
지금 이용 불가 (1) | ||||
자료실 | E204853 | 대출중 | 2024.08.12 |
지금 이용 불가 (1)
- 등록번호
- E204853
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출중
- 2024.08.12
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
- 자료실
책 소개
목차
I. Static Games of Complete Information
1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
2.Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties
II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3.Extensive-Form Games
4.Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
5.Repeated Games
III. Static Games of Incomplete Information
6.Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
7.Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8.Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
9.Reputation Effects
10.Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete
V. Advanced Topics
11.More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
12.Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
13.Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov
14.Common Knowledge and Games