본문 바로가기

에너지경제연구원 전자도서관

로그인

에너지경제연구원 전자도서관

자료검색

  1. 메인
  2. 자료검색
  3. 통합검색

통합검색

단행본

Game Theory

발행사항
Cambridge, Mass. ; London : MIT Press, 1991
형태사항
xxiii,579p. : ill.; 26cm
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index
소장정보
위치등록번호청구기호 / 출력상태반납예정일
지금 이용 불가 (1)
자료실E204853대출중2024.08.12
지금 이용 불가 (1)
  • 등록번호
    E204853
    상태/반납예정일
    대출중
    2024.08.12
    위치/청구기호(출력)
    자료실
책 소개
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.



About the Author

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

목차
I. Static Games of Complete Information 1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium 2.Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information 3.Extensive-Form Games 4.Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions 5.Repeated Games III. Static Games of Incomplete Information 6.Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium 7.Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 8.Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection 9.Reputation Effects 10.Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete V. Advanced Topics 11.More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance 12.Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games 13.Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov 14.Common Knowledge and Games
저자 소개
저자 장 티롤
2014년 노벨 경제학상을 수상한 프랑스의 경제학자다. 게임이론과 산업조직론의 대가로 알려져 있다. 파리 9대학교에서 수학 박사 학위를, 미국 매사추세츠 공과대학교(MIT)에서 경제학 박사 학위를 받았다. 현재 툴루즈 경제대학교(TSE) 교수이자 MIT 초빙 교수로 활동하고 있다.
작가의 다른 작품

알라딘에서 제공한 저자 정보입니다.상세보기

주제어