This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

About the Author

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

I. Static Games of Complete Information 1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium 2.Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information 3.Extensive-Form Games 4.Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions 5.Repeated Games III. Static Games of Incomplete Information 6.Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium 7.Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 8.Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection 9.Reputation Effects 10.Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete V. Advanced Topics 11.More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance 12.Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games 13.Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov 14.Common Knowledge and Games