
단행본
The handbook of market design
- 발행사항
- New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2013
- 형태사항
- ⅹⅹⅳ,681p. ; 26cm
- 서지주기
- Includes index(661-681p.)
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책 소개
This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges
목차
Introduction
PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?
2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory
PART II: CASES
SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS
4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange
5. School Choice
6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice
7. Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?
8. Designing Markets for Ideas
9. Redesigning Microcredit
SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS
10. The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
SECTION II.C: E COMMERCE
13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets
16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing
17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith
SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN
18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
PART III: EXPERIMENTS
20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction ;
21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS
24. Competing Mechanisms
25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
Index