보고서
Post-crisis Regulatory Reforms to Secure Financial Stability
- 저자
- 허석균 | Taehoon Youn
- 발행사항
- 서울 KDI 2010
- 형태사항
- 444p. cm
소장정보
위치 | 등록번호 | 청구기호 / 출력 | 상태 | 반납예정일 |
---|---|---|---|---|
이용 가능 (1) | ||||
자료실 | P420594 | 대출가능 | - |
이용 가능 (1)
- 등록번호
- P420594
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
- 자료실
목차
Opening Remarks
Keynote Speech
Conference Schedule
Contributors
CHAPTER 1 A Tax on Systemic Risk
1. Introduction
2. Regulating Systemic Financial Risk
3. Contingent Capital Insurance: Theory and Evidence
4. A Public-Private Plan
5. Relationship to Other Proposals
6. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER 2 Political Economy of Macro-prudential Regulation in Korea
1. Introduction
2. Financial Stability and Macro-prudential Approach to Financial Regulation
3. System for Financial Stability in Korea
4. Political Economy of Macro-prudential Regulation in Korea
CHAPTER 3 US and EU Reforms for Preventing Future Systemic Crises,
1. Introduction and Road Map
2. The Existing Policy Framework and Why Its Systemic Weaknesses
3. Broad-Brush Lessons for Prevention and Resolution of Systemic Problems
4. Description and Assessment of Reform Proposals
5. Concluding Thoughts
CHAPTER 4 Dynamic Provisioning: Some Lessons from Existing Experiences
1. Why is the Financial System So Procyclical?
2. How to Reduce the Procyclicality of the Financial System
3. Existing Experiences
4. Comparison Between Spain, Peru, and Colombia
5. Conclusions
CHAPTER 5 Pro-cyclical Bank Lending and Counter-cyclical Financial Regulation
1. Introduction
2. Pro-cyclicality of Bank Lending and Regulatory Measures
3. Pro-cyclicality in Korean Financial System
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
CHAPTER 6 Pro-cyclicality of Bank Loans under Information Asymmetry
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. A Model
4. A Solution
5. Regulator’s Determination of Capital Requirement: Pro-cyclical vs. Counter-cyclical Measures
6. Extension to the Case of Multiple Loans
7. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER 7 Securitization without Risk Transfer
1. Institutional Background
2. Theoretical Framework
3. Empirical Analysis
4. Benefits to Banks of Securitization without Risk Transfer
5. Related literature
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER 8 Restoring the Role of Credit Rating Agencies as Gatekeepers
1. Introduction
2. Benchmark Model
3. Extensions
4. Policy Implications and Extensions
5. Appendix
CHAPTER 9 Margin and Funding Liquidity: An Empirical Analysis on the Covered Interest Parity in Korea
1. Introduction
2. A Margin Based Asset Pricing Model
3. Econometric Methodology
4. Empirical Procedure
5. CIP Deviation, Margin, and Illiquidity
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER 10 Capital Insurance and Bank Managers Compensation
1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. Bail-out Procedures
4. The Inefficiency of Cost Minimizing Regulation
5. Optimal Constract
6. The Case Where Bank Managers Are Scarce
7. Implementation
8. Implementation
9. Conclusion
10. Appendix
CHAPTER 11 Managerial Compensation and Risk-taking in Banks
1. Introduction
2. Compensation and Incentives in Banks
3. Banks in Korea: an Empirical Study
4. Conclusion
CHAPTER 12 Hoarding International Reserves versus a Pigovian Tax-cum-subsidy Scheme: Reflections on the Deleveraging Crisis of 2008-9, and a Cost Benefit Analysis
1. IR as Self-insurance During a Crisis: the Crisis Experience of EMs
2. International Reserves at Times of Global Financial Distress: Reflections and Assessment of Future Options.
3. Discussion
CHAPTER 13 Foreign Exchange Exposures of Korean Firms
1. Introduction
2. Concept of Foreign Exchange Exposure
3. Measurement and Characteristics of Foreign Exchange Exposures
4. Determinants of Foreign Exchange Exposures
5. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER 14 The Collapse of a Country
1. Introduction
2. Historical Background
3. Prelude to the Collapse
4. Destabilizing Speculation
5. Warnings
6. Government’s Response -gambling for Resurrection
7. A systemic Crisis
8. Coping with the Crisis
9. Future Prospects
10. What Should Be Done
11. Conclusion